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**SURGING DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES:
INCREASING USE OF RESERVE COMPONENT
INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS (RCIE)**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER S. PEDIGO
United States Army National Guard**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Surging Defense Intelligence Capabilities:
Increasing Use of Reserve Component
Intelligence Elements (RCIE)

by

LTC Walter S. Pedigo

Professor Mike Morin
Project Advisor

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ABSTRACT

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U.S. Defense Intelligence is changing. Volatility, identification of global threats, information technology advances, emphasis on theater intelligence, and reduced defense budgets are all fomenting change. As a consequence, Reserve Component Intelligence Elements (RCIE) are providing increasing support to defense intelligence organizations. This paper describes the enhanced role of RCIE in support of theater intelligence. Increased use of qualified RCIE and their relatively new access to state-of-the-art DOD-funded information technologies and facilities contribute to their effectiveness. Implementation of service-owned Title 10 RC assets to support real intelligence requirements is unfortunately difficult. Likewise, the Army has not developed innovative force structure models for integrating RCIE. This study recommends that the Army use Title 10 authority flexibly, acknowledging the changing threat and the increasing need for intelligence at echelons above corps (EAC). It thereby proposes integration of RCIE with Army organizations in the theater to satisfy theater intelligence requirements and comply with joint doctrine.

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INTRODUCTION

As the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) enters the twenty-first century, the way in which it performs collection and analysis activities is changing rapidly. Volatility, identification of global threats, emphasis on support to joint organizations, increasing demands of intelligence personnel, budgetary reductions, and the tremendous advances in information technology are major influences of this change.

While the U.S. continues to downsize its military intelligence force, initiatives are underway to surge intelligence capabilities. Leveraged capabilities are those not exploited at full capacity when the active component DOD is well funded and when the threat is easily identified. These capabilities include industry and open-source collection, civilian linguistic and analytical capabilities, technological innovations, and the Reserve Component Intelligence Elements (RCIE).

This study analyzes the feasibility of leveraging the large numbers of Army RCIE by combining their expertise in with information technology to support the intelligence requirements of theater combatant commanders. Several factors favor this leveraging option: "reserve intelligence forces represent approximately 40% of DOD's total uniformed military intelligence personnel assets;"¹ "spends only 5% of DOD's budget in salaries;"² along with the technological revolution, RCIE has

been called a protective influence to a downsized active component force;³ finally, RCIE is made up of experienced personnel who, by virtue of their military background and civilian expertise, can provide added value to DOD intelligence customers.

An initiative in 1995 from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has already attempted to leverage talent in the RCIE-the Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP). It has successfully raised the visibility of RCIE to other DOD intelligence organizations by funding information connectivity at 28 CONUS sites and providing for RC active duty for real intelligence production.⁴

Unfortunately, OSD's JRIP and the Army intelligence community have not cooperated well in this initiative. They disagree on Title 10 RC assets to support intelligence requirements of non-Army intelligence organizations. The JRIP seeks authority to assign intelligence production tasks to Army RCIE units with expectations that those requirements take priority over the Army's own training and mobilization missions.⁵

Despite the Army's reservation, JRIP's position that maximum use of RCIE to produce theater intelligence enhances wartime readiness has considerable merit. This paper recommends that the Army use Title 10 authority flexibly, acknowledging the changing threat and the increasing need for intelligence production at the theater level.

To support this flexible use of Title 10 assets, this paper proposes an innovative approach for the Army to integrate selected RCIE with Army organizations that will provide on-going intelligence support to theaters and comply with joint doctrine in peacetime, conflict and war.⁶

THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country--the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.⁷

Clauswitz, On War (1832)

BACKGROUND

During the Cold War, the military's Intelligence Community (IC) had a clear focus on the threat, which was then the Soviet Union. As a consequence, the U.S. military was able to analyze and determine logical, predictable and worst-case enemy courses of action. And the enemy was clearly identified as the Soviet Military. In response to these identified Soviet Military capabilities, the U.S. military force structure was designed to meet and defeat that threat. Today we face an uncertain, unpredictable, and more dangerous world situation.

The end of the Cold War not only removed the single overwhelming focus of the IC, but also contributed to a breakdown of international order in specific regions, which contributed to the growth of ethnic warfare and exacerbated a number of transnational issues. A rapid succession of disparate but not wholly dissimilar issues -- Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda -- have put added stress on the IC. Before these crises arose, most of

these were areas of little, if any, interest to policy makers and, thus, to the IC. Consequently, the ability of the IC to 'surge' resources -- i.e., to focus collection and analysis, and sometimes operational capabilities -- on these suddenly important areas is of increasing importance.⁸

How is DOD now dealing with this new and unpredictable world? Certainly innovation and the willingness to make significant change in intelligence operations are in order. Yet DOD still maintains stove-piped, hierarchical, and regimented intelligence organizations. They provide for little division of labor, minimal sharing of intelligence amongst units and organizations by analysts, and inadequate dissemination of information. Their efforts are typically duplicative, resulting in a unit's dependency on its own organic intelligence capability. Information technology has brought improved communication to defense intelligence; however, intelligence organizations are slow in adapting to the new and rapidly developing technological era. We need much more interagency flexibility within DOD. Overcoming bureaucratic resistance is the logical starting place and a tougher job.⁹

Personnel reductions and the redesign of separate intelligence organizations have occurred. But we have essentially the same intelligence organizations, only with less people and different structures. Mass procurement of information systems technology by separate military departments, DOD field activities and combat service support organizations continues as

the norm. Services are still the primary developers of requirements for resources, human capital, and technology. Given separate service requirements for consumption of information systems, "DOD has found itself with a cornucopia of incompatible systems that to this day remain plagued with obstacles to the free flow of information."¹⁰

VISION FOR CHANGE

Fortunately, the IC has a vision for real change. The vision is known as Virtual Intelligence. The implementer of this vision is JIVA (Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture). Virtuality will provide flexible response to crisis, surging knowledge and information technology, and optimal use of human capital. These enhanced capabilities will facilitate achievement of several objectives: accelerated intelligence process, elimination of physical limitations posed by location and mobility requirements, enhanced synthesizing of complex information. Certainly, creative use of virtual intelligence is a beginning.¹¹

But some organizations whose roles and missions are being replaced by JIVA's stated objectives are skeptical of the manner in which JIVA is implemented. Those organizations may have performed admirably during the Cold War, or in countering other focused singular threats. But the current environment is much different. "It may not be as important for the Intelligence Community (IC) to be able to identify, with specificity, future intelligence targets as it is for the IC to ensure that it has

the flexibility necessary to respond quickly and competently to those targets." ¹²

RCIE SURGE

Using all intelligence collection and analytical capabilities (and thus not to rely on only those assets in the active component military) offers one approach to establishing a more responsive IC.

Development of a flexible, responsive, and prepared IC, as JIVA espouses, involves focusing personnel with information. Ideally, it means assigning MI personnel to organizations that have wartime readiness responsibilities in theaters, with the least stability and greatest volatility. Developing expertise on these areas of potential crisis is key. Certainly, advances in technology of information systems is enabling us to spread the workload. However, the human element will make the difference.

Achieving a total, fully participating, and integrated intelligence force of both active and reserve components that share that latest technology is a smart start.

The only way we can begin to approach satisfaction of the full range of our commanders' intelligence requirements is to get the total intelligence force, active and reserve, tactical [below division] and strategic [echelon above corps], involved in a coordinated division of collection and analytical labor in which we focus the total talent of the intelligence force. By doing this we create the significant by-product of technically proficient, target smart collectors and analysts in every component at every echelon, while contributing to a significantly increased level of community knowledge. ¹³

THE TOTAL INTELLIGENCE FORCE OPTION

We are capitalizing on the Department of Defense (DOD) peacetime utilization plan that the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved in January 1995. This is a plan to enhance peacetime use of the ARNG and USAR MI force. It reinforces the realization at the highest levels that we can get added value from the ARNG and USAR MI force by applying their great talent and capabilities in peacetime, as well as crises and war.¹⁴

LTG Paul E. Menoher Jr.

THE VALUE

A DOD initiative already facilitates the use of the Military Intelligence Reserve force to help expand IC research, collection, and analysis capabilities to support theaters. That initiative is formulated in the 1995 Secretary of Defense Implementation Plan for the Peacetime Use of the Reserve Component Intelligence Elements, now known as JRIP. JRIP includes all RCIE from all services. This analysis focuses on the Army:

The purpose of the DOD Plan [now JRIP] is to establish a comprehensive, integrated program to ensure the Reserve Military Intelligence force will be able to effectively meet the peacetime-through-mobilization requirements of the Unified Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Combat Security Service (CSS) and the National Imagery Mapping Agency (NIMA).¹⁵

JRIP serves as a catalyst for the RCIE to perform more timely and accurate intelligence research, analysis, and production in direct support of DOD and National intelligence organizations. It does this by providing substantial additional intelligence funds and direction for the procurement of state of the art

information systems and connectivity. It also provides active duty day (manday) funding for reserve intelligence analysts and linguists. Significantly, the program has greatly improved visibility of RCIE through interoperable global connectivity from 28 Continental U.S. (CONUS) Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC) or sites.

The DOD standard for secure connectivity present at these sites is Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). JWICS supports transmission of data, JDISS is the workstation that supports production and dissemination of fused intelligence critical to the theater.¹⁶

Although the sites are owned by different services and are not joint, each site supports all military departments and DOD intelligence organizations. These sites are facilities, not TOE or TDA units. They provide a place where multi-service RCIE units can train while providing intelligence support. Reservists and their units can accomplish training requirements through distance learning in the strategic, operational and tactical arenas; at the same time, they perform real world peacetime contributory support to intelligence organizations. This real support in turn offers reservists training in research, collection, analysis, and communication automation.

Establishment of these interconnected intelligence sites has had a profoundly positive effect on theater intelligence

customers. It provides the Army with skilled MI human resources from CONUS; it is available real-time through state-of-art secure connectivity.

The advantages are obvious:

First, the Army's RCIE is a more accessible asset for the IC. To offset reductions in the active MI force, the Army is benefiting from a robust technical revolution in the area of information automation connectivity. This tremendous added value now enables the Army RCIE to join the IC to collect information, conduct analysis, produce intelligence, and ultimately satisfy DOD and theater intelligence requirements. Real-time strategic intelligence can now be conducted in CONUS sanctuaries. Reserve as well as active component MI soldiers no longer need to be physically present abroad. Connectivity has reduced the size of the regions of the globe significantly.

Second, during crises, theater organizations can collaborate with the citizen warrior as an individual, team, or unit without a cumbersome presidential or congressional reserve activation. We can now sustain a constant working relationship that is seamless, timely and flexible.

Third, as with classified sources, open source intelligence (OSCINT) is now very accessible. OSCINT information is gathered public sources and data bases. The RCIE provide relief in the form of additional human resources who have connectivity for research and analysis into the multitudes of OSCINT sources.¹⁷

Finally, use of Army intelligence reservists provides cost savings and international expertise. RCIE consumes five percent of the Defense Budget for intelligence, but they represent forty percent of the total force (all services).¹⁸ Their military skills and current civilian status-whether government, private, or self-employed, add expertise in support of the IC.

The Fort Sheridan Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (ARISC) offers an excellent example of theater use of the RCIE. An Army-owned site, it is used by reservists of all services. One of the 28 Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRIC), Sheridan provides connectivity for Army MI soldiers assigned to the TDA of the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth, England. JACMOLESWORTH is the intelligence asset to the J2 European Command (EUCOM).¹⁹

Significantly, JACMOLESWORTH has great confidence in the ARISC soldiers. In the DIA vision, virtuality offers a close reality. JAC Army Reservists collaborate with analysts from various agencies as if they were present at the JAC. Intelligence production is a shared effort. The training is totally stimulating because the intelligence requirements are real. "The JAC's responsibility includes 83 countries and territories. This year, reservists have provided more than 50 percent of the JAC's scheduled intelligence production."²⁰

The alignment of the Sheridan facility with the JAC was achieved through the JRIP. Sheridan was chosen to be the test

bed in 1996 after the JRIP was approved by the Secretary of Defense in 1995. It is now permanently aligned as an asset to JACMOLESWORTH; 84 RC soldiers are assigned the JAC TDA, who provide support from the Sheridan facility. (See Table 1 for assignment of RCIE to EUCOM JAC and other CINC and DOD intelligence organizations). ²¹

TABLE 1: USAR CINC and DOD SUPPORT

COMMAND	IMAs	TPU	IRR	TOTAL
PACOM Hq	8		0	8
PACOM JIC	23		0	23
PACOM JIC Dets	0	194	0	194
PACOM USFJ	6		25	31
ALCOM	1		11	12
PACOM SOC	5		23	28
SOC KOREA	18		28	46
USFK	1		0	1
SOCOM HQ	21		0	21
SOCOM JIC	12		0	12
CENTCOM	2		3	5
CENTCOM JIC	101		71	172
CENT SOC	17		19	36
ACOM SOC	8		1	9
ACOM Intel Cmd	0	87	0	87
SOUTHCOM HQ	2		6	8
SOUTHCOM JIC	29		10	39
SOC SOUTH	15		10	25
SPACECOM	9		0	9
NORAD	4		0	4
EUCOM HQ	4		1	5
EUCOM JAC	84		0	84
SOCEUR	15		26	41
DIA	0	189	0	189
TOTAL	385	470	234	1089

Key: * **IMA** (Individual Mobilization Augmentees) Of the 385, 81 participant 2 weeks per year, 303 are 24 drills (each month for 6 months) + AT
 * **TPU** (Troop Program Unit) 48 drills (each month) + AT
 * **IRR** (Individual Ready Reserve) AT not required.

In sum, visibility of the few RCIE in support of theaters has been drastically increased. As a result, they are accessible,

better trained, and more knowledgeable about theater intelligence operations. Through flexible connectivity, RCIE contribute to the vision of virtual intelligence.²² This has accelerated the intelligence process and nearly overcome geographic and mobilization limitations.

Unfortunately, only a very small percentage of available USAR are assigned in support of Theaters. Although 1089 are listed in Table 1, approximately 12,000 (USAR & ARNG) remain assigned or aligned to lower level Army organizations: INSCOM (EAC) USAR units (approximately 5000), and tactical MI units of the ARNG's 8 Divisions and 15 Enhanced Brigades (approximately 7000). These are members of the Army's RCIE; they participate regularly each month and during AT and are assigned to TOE or TDA units. It is with this remaining 12,000 majority of Army aligned RCIE where there is now OSD and Army disagreement over their best use.²³

CHANGE AND THE INCREASED USE OF THE RCIE

The lack of vision, energy, and understanding demonstrated at most senior levels of the intelligence community is appalling. The intelligence community is 'trapped' in a web of contractual relationships which include obligations to employees whose skills have atrophied or are no longer required, but it is precisely under such circumstances when visionary leadership, and the ability to 'think outside the envelope' are most precious.²⁴

Robert D. Steele

THE ARGUMENT

Near virtual intelligence and its accompanying theater flexibility have been achieved in the Sheridan example. The Army supports this integration of its assigned RCIE forces in support of EUCOM as well as the other RCIE forces listed in Table 1. However, there is disagreement about the manner in which JRIP expects to utilize the remaining 12,000 Army RCIE (USAR and ARNG) not formally assigned responsibilities to support theater intelligence requirements. The disagreement is between OSD and the Army over peacetime use of Army RCIE. The three basic issues of disagreement are interrelated and inherent to peacetime use: wartime readiness enhancement, the Army's Title 10 authority, and the manner in which Theaters access Army RCIE.

First and foremost, the Army contends wartime readiness is best achieved when soldiers and units first train to the mission of the organization to which they are assigned for mobilization for war. As such, the 1089 soldiers listed in Table 1, including Fort Sheridan, should continue their priority efforts in support

of the Theater organizations to which they are assigned.

However, the 7000 ARNG soldiers assigned to the 8 Divisions and 15 Enhanced Brigades, and the 5000 USAR soldiers aligned to INSCOM should first satisfy training requirements of those Army service component organizations.

In contrast, OSD's JRIP contends that wartime readiness is best enhanced when the RCIE satisfies real intelligence missions in peacetime in support of in peacetime in support of Theaters and National organizations. Those within OSD, believe satisfying real intelligence requirements is better training than simulated training typically provided by Army units, such as those within the ARNG, USAR and the active Army. Furthermore, JRIP proposes using all RCIE all the time, tactical or otherwise, to satisfy priority DOD intelligence requirements first, instead of Army mobilization and training requirements.²⁵ Certainly, the improvement in military readiness by satisfying real intelligence tasks is evident in the Fort Sheridan example.

Second, the Army concern "with the JRIP is it shifts Title 10 responsibilities from the Services to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)."²⁶ The Army sees Title 10 as giving it responsibility and authority for training and mobilization readiness of its forces. It is designed to eliminate obstacles and detractors from military preparedness. It makes readiness the highest priority. Since the JRIP is now up for codification,

the Army fears the program may usurp the use of its Title 10 Army RCIE to satisfy DOD and theater intelligence requirements.

The counter argument from OSD and proponents of the JRIP is for the Army to recognize changing requirements of intelligence organizations especially the support of theater commanders whom Congress holds responsible for warfighting and engagements. Where is the intelligence skill most needed? Should training for possible mobilization be the Army's ultimate priority when there is a critical peacetime need for theater commanders.

By treating intelligence units strictly as mobilization assets, these units have been subjected to resource cuts and constraints as are any other reserve units. But intelligence is most effective for national security when it can deliver predictive analysis and warning well ahead of a crisis. This, it seems is somewhat shortsighted to hoard capability that might be used to both prevent a crisis and certainly to prepare for a crisis, for the sake of ownership or control.²⁷

The third bone of contention is the manner in which customer access is achieved. The Army would prefer the organization with which the RCIE will deploy in war have independent access to their assigned or aligned RCIE.²⁸

Under JRIP, DIA is assigned responsibility to "establish a functional interface between the RCIE and the supported DOD components."²⁹ The intent is to coordinate at DIA Theater intelligence requirements for those non-joint Army aligned RCIE. This is traditionally a service responsibility, which the tactical Army, corps and below, has performed for requesting CINCs. However, since the end of the Cold War, corps and

divisions with tactical RCIE, have on occasion informally expanded their MI personnel assets to support organizations at the Echelon above Corps level (EAC).³⁰

There is some justification for the change. Technological advances and asymmetrical threats have shifted intelligence gathering capabilities from the tactical battlefield to EAC and Theaters. The requirements for intelligence analysis are rightfully oriented to theaters, where functional organizations emphasize specific skills such as Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). The Army's corps and below, when organized as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF), can now be directly supported by intelligence capabilities at the JTF or theater level and at DOD functional levels such as at National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).

THE SUMMATION

Although arguments about whose Title 10 authority is paramount and access to Army RCIE are important, they are not as significant compared to the realization about what is best for enhancing the wartime readiness of the RCIE. In effect, the JRIP has a win-win claim. Use of RC intelligence personnel at DOD and theater levels both deters or prevents crisis and prepares soldiers for crisis in the theaters. The JRIP, however, is not addressing the structural (or at least the operational)

integration of RCIE with Theater and Defense intelligence organizations.

Unfortunately, the Army is reacting with little flexibility and innovation by not considering alternatives that would support JRIP, and still maintain Title 10 control over their reservists. Neither DOD nor the Army are exploiting the Sheridan example. Military departments and joint theater organizations should be the innovators in meeting OSD's JRIP goal, which would only increase RCIE use. OSD should task the services to design new service intelligence structure supporting joint doctrine. This structure should match standards of wartime RCIE readiness for the Army and for the supported theater or joint intelligence organizations. Intelligence tasks will then naturally follow.

Lacking the innovative means by which to integrate Army RCIE, toward regional efforts, Unified Commands (or CINCs) have little choice other than to provide individual tasks to DIA for subsequent delivery to qualified individuals and units of the RCIE. Such piecemeal tasking does not develop robust capability to provide on-going theater intelligence. Likewise CINCs do not become familiar with RCIE organizations and their supporting structures in peacetime. Most importantly, CINCs do not have a chance to appreciate their expertise. When CINCs go through DIA for access to service RCIE this only adds to an already cumbersome stove-piped system.³¹

INTEGRATION INFLUENCES WARTIME READINESS ENHANCEMENT

The demands inherent in the Total Force policy have brought the Reserve components of all services to a much higher state of readiness and modernization than existed in 1970. However, the policy is very much a work in progress, and there remain significant issues and impediments that have not yet been fully addressed or resolved.³²

MG William E. Barron, USAR

THE RESOLUTION

The OSD JRIP should require the Army to provide more RCIE forces dedicated to support each Theater. From a peacetime training perspective, this will be key to focusing RCIE to priority intelligence requirements, and enhancing their wartime readiness even down to the tactical level. JRIP through DIA should not direct provisions of utilization, training, mobilization, standards to achieve wartime readiness. JRIP likewise should not decide theater missions for intelligence contributory support by service-owned assets. The role of DIA should be to prioritize all intelligence production requirements for the entire military IC as it currently does under its DOD Intelligence Production Program (DODIPP). There should be no separate RCIE production manager.

Essential to JRIP implementation is a flexible and structural integration of the RCIE in support of theater intelligence organizations. As seen with the RCIE at Table 1, this kind of relationship provides sponsorship on the part of the Theater. The

Theater is in a better position to assess it's own RCIE training and wartime readiness, while placing the Army in an administrative support role. It shifts DIA's interface responsibilities as liaison between CINCs and RCIE directly to the Theaters. Most importantly, theater intelligence provides for a much more attuned, motivated, and responsive RCIE to a real intelligence mission, far more important to the nation than simulated tactical training for some future mobilization.

The Army has proposed an organization tailored to each CINC that is ideal for effective integration of select Army RCIE assets not already assigned to Theaters and Combat Support Organizations. Unfortunately, it is not yet part of this JRIP/Army debate. The Theater Support Command (TSC) provides innovative organizational redesign. It offers a concept for support of command and control at echelons above corps (EAC) in the theater. The TSC provides for flexible and centralized management of Army support functions for the Theater's Army Service Component Commander (ASCC). Under each CINC is the ASCC, the Air Force Service Component Command (AFSCC), the Navy Service Component Command (NSCC) and the Marine Corps Service Component Command (MCSCC). All of these component commands respond to force requirements from the CINC. Emphasis is on the integration of CSS (PERSCOM, FINCOM, ENCOM, MEDCOM etc) to support the senior Army force commander and the CINC. Although the Intelligence and Security Command's (INSCOM) 513th Force Projection Brigade (AC)

is included as part of ARCENT, INSCOM AC and RCIE have not yet been formally assigned to each of the Theaters through their ASCC and TSC.³³

This integration of RCIE into the TSC can provide a modularized mix of RC and AC MI units that match capabilities with regional mission tasks from the CINC's JIC. It provides situational flexibility for tailoring additional MI personnel to support the CINC, but not necessarily assigned to the JIC TDA. It provides mission contingency requirements simultaneously for strategic, operational and tactical intelligence support within the CINC's theater. It supports split-based, sanctuary concepts and JRIP-funded CONUS connectivity initiatives by not requiring the physical co-location of RCIE in theater. Most important, the parent Army organizations of RCIE units or individual soldiers (to include the Army National Guard) will retain administrative control responsibilities.

Breaking the bureaucratic gridlock between the Army and the JRIP involves the Title 10 issue. TSC eliminates this conflict. The ASCC, which the TSC supports, already satisfies service Title 10 responsibilities. The combatant command requires the ASCC, as with the other service component commands, to supervise employment of its service capabilities.³⁴ Further,

The ASCC also satisfies training, administration, and logistics support requirements for Army forces throughout the unified command, through administrative or service channels. The deployed TSC will centralize

Army CSS and selected CS functions, within its area of responsibility, under one commander.³⁵

The ASCC primarily supports the CINC with all aspects of Army support, including support to other services. Consequently, the combat support function provided by intelligence can be better integrated into the ASCC process through its TSC. The Army's rejection of the JRIP without investigating Army alternative support options currently being staffed for theater exploitation is incomplete staff work. This is a perfect opportunity for the Army to initiate realistic support for theater and joint organizations, which will, in turn, improve the Army's understanding and performance in the theater. Today and in the future, intelligence collection and analysis is driven by joint organizations with theater responsibilities. The Army needs to take the lead for integrating its RCIE in support of joint doctrine.

CONCLUSION

The Army is not taking advantage of supporting the theater intelligence effort, which will give them an advantageous relationship with the theater commander's basis for planning. The JRIP is planning on its own implementation for increased RCIE use. Hence, JRIP is paying little heed to structural or operational integration of RCIE with supported organizations. The Army's cautiousness and lack of innovative support to JRIP

implementation is indicative of how the Army lacks understanding of its own and creative uses of its own reserve component. Unfortunately, only the JRIP proposal has slowly begun leveraging service assets to support global regions with proper expertise.

The Army has the opportunity to improve the JRIP attempt to increase the use of RCIE and take the lead in support of joint doctrine. The Army could do this by assigning its non-joint RCIE to the Army Service Component Command's (ASCC) proposed Theater Support Command (TSC), of each Regional CINC. This will support the JRIP vision for increased peacetime use of the RCIE.

By integrating the RCIE with the TSC eliminates arguments between the Army and OSD about the proper peacetime use of the RCIE. First, it would obviously enhance wartime readiness of the reserve intelligence members of the ARNG and USAR. Their efforts during training periods would be to satisfy real peacetime intelligence requirements of the Theater ASCC. This would greatly improve RCIE expertise in the region, where they may support ground or other forces. Second, it would eliminate the need for DIA to assign theater intelligence requirements to RCIE and provide interface. The more RCIE structure assigned forward and in direct support of the region, the less coordinating interface by DIA would be needed between the Theater and the RCIE. CINCs, through the ASCC and TSC, would directly leverage RCIE to perform intelligence production in the region. Third, it would give the Army authority over its forces for mobilization

preparedness, since the RCIE would be part of the ASCC. The Army's Title 10 authority would not be violated.

Plenty of uncompleted intelligence requirements exist from all Unified Commands. RCIE could satisfy these requirements. Substantial numbers of RCIE-including all of the USAR EAC force and select portions of the ARNG tactical intelligence-force are up to the task. Now is the time to assign sufficient intelligence analytical capability to CINCs because the Army's primary role is to support the CINC in peacetime, conflict or war. The TSC is certainly designed flexibly to allow for such numbers of reserves. In this situation, all stand to win if logical initiatives are taken. (6164)

ENDNOTES

¹ The Deputy Secretary of Defense, SUBJECT: Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements, 5 Jan 1995, page 4.

² Deputy Chief Army Reserve April 1997 USAR briefing.

³ International Journal of Intelligence and Counter intelligence. Vol 10, No. 2, Summer 1997. "Virtual Intelligence: Reengineering Doctrine for the Information Age, by Michael J. Castagna. p. 182.

⁴ The Deputy Secretary of Defense, SUBJECT: Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Military Intelligence Elements, 5 Jan 95.

⁵ Draft Department of Defense Directive, SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Reserve Program (DIRP), No. 1200.XX, para 4.1. and updated Draft Directive SUBJECT: Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), dated Jan 27, 1998, para 4.1. and 4.2.

⁶ FM 100-5, Operations, Chapter 2, page 2-1.

⁷ Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, Chapter IV, Joint Intelligence Principles. page IV-1

⁸ C21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. Staff Study. Congress (US) Washington DC 1996. page 233.

⁹ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Vol 10, No. 2, Summer 1997. "Virtual Intelligence: Reengineering Doctrine for the Information Age," by Michael J. Castagna.

¹⁰ Ibid. page 193.

¹¹ Vector 21, A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997. "The Future System." page 20.

¹² C21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. Staff Study. Congress (US) Washington DC 1996. page 233.

¹³ Dept of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), SUBJECT: Draft vision to Intel XXI, dated, August 1995.

¹⁴ Military Intelligence Magazine, "One Team, One Vector," Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. page 40.

¹⁵ The Deputy Secretary of Defense, SUBJECT: Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements, 5 Jan 1995, page 3.

¹⁶ Vector 21, A Strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997. "Networks and a System of Systems." page 18.

¹⁷ International Journal of Intelligence and counterintelligence, "The Importance of Open Source Intelligence To the Military," by Robert D. Steele. Vol 8, No. 4, Winter 1995, page 467.

¹⁸ OCAR Presentation, "America's Army Reserve," April 97 and the 1995 DOD Plan for the Peacetime Use of the Reserve Component Military Intelligence Elements, page 4.

¹⁹ Army Times, "Reserve intelligence forces take larger role in NATO," October 27, 1997, page 20.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Personal interview with LTC Ed McClure and MAJ Stanley Walthall, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Reserve Affairs (DAMI-RA), December 1, 1997.

²² Vector 21, A strategic Plan for the Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997. "The Future System" page 20.

²³ Personal interview with the Director, Reserve Affairs, (COL Jim Stewart) Deputy Cheif of Staff for Intelligence, (DAMI-RA), 29 January 1998. Pentagon, Washington DC.

²⁴ International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, "Robert D. Steele, Volume 7, number 2, page 199.

²⁵ DOD Directive, SUBJECT: Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), para 4.1, 4.2, dated 01/27/98.

²⁶ Dept of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Memo, SUBJECT: Implementation Plan for the Peacetime Use of Reserve Component Intelligence Elements, dated 27 Sept 1994, para. 1.

²⁷ C21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century. Staff Study. Congress (US) Washington DC 1995. page 238.

²⁸ Assessed from LTC Pedigo's assignment at DADCSINT March 95-June 97. Reluctance on the part of the Army to support DIA's Reserve Intelligence Integration Division (RIID) was evident in several Pentagon meetings from July 95 to its creation in May 1996. Such meetings were DADCSINT Architecture panel meetings and DIA's year long struggle to get the OCAR to assign Army liaison personnel to the RIID.

²⁹ DOD Directive, SUBJECT: Joint Reserve Intelligence Program (JRIP), dated 01/27/98.

³⁰ 1995 Briefing from LTC Pedigo to DA Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence on comparative contributory support funding of service production requirements vs Joint production requirements. Findings were: 70% of active duty day funding was in support of Joint organizations.

³¹ DIA's 9 April 97 Military Intelligence board (MIB) Meeting Minutes, dated 17 April 97. pages 1-5. Key participants at MIB: Deputy Director DIA, NIMA, ASD (RA), DASD (I&S), DIA J2, NRO, General Officers from each Military Dept and Service, Unified Commands represented by their J2s via VTC.

³² ROA National Security Report, "Reserve Component Roles and Missions," by MG William E. Barron, USAR, Chairman, ROA Ad Hoc Committee on Reserve Component Roles and Missions, Sept 97, page 25.

³³ Draft Concept for Support Command and Control at Echelons above Corps, 6 Dec 1996, pages 1-17.

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³⁴ Draft Concept for Support Command and Control al Echelons above Corps, 6 Dec 1996, para 5A, page 9-10.

³⁵ Ibid. page 9-10

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